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In Teaching for Dissent, Sarah Stitzlein argues that not only is American society 
obliged to include the concept of dissent in the educational curriculum, but that 
pragmatist doctrines provide encouraging rationale for its practice. When we think 
of dissent and education, they are usually at odds; images of student protests or a 
recalcitrant pupil are likely foremost in our minds. As the father of a rambunctious 
toddler, I am not so sure that teaching for dissent is high on my list of preferred 
preschool activities, but there is something to be said for making citizens aware of 
their right and democratic duty to voice opposition. Stitzlein is making the case 
that it is a civic obligation to practice dissent and that its necessity warrants class-
room time amongst the competing interests of achievement test preparation and 
the objectives of a well-rounded education. 
The justification for teaching for dissent is especially American; the Found-
ers supported it (for the educated elite) and the pragmatists showed how it could 
be done a century ago. Do we still have the same type of dissent in mind today? 
Stitzlein recognizes that the angry debate between political parties provides the 
popular conception of dissent, but she is promoting a return to the ideal of the 
political philosophers like Jefferson and Paine. It is not just a valuable activity, she 
says, contrasting the way “dissent is [currently] understood as a negative right—a 
freedom to be engaged without government intervention—[while proposing] in-
stead that dissent should be seen as a positive right—a freedom that requires cer-
tain governmental supports.”1 The main issue that her thesis must (and to some 
extent does) confront is a shift in our educational priorities to return to a liberal 
arts perspective. This is no small task in the era of No Child Left Behind and Mas-
sive Open Online Course (MOOC) approaches to education, but there is precedent 
for looking to better options in the classroom.2
The book starts its argument at the time of the American Revolution, crediting 
Jefferson as the force behind the end of censorship in schools: “[Jefferson] believed 
that if schools were going to teach children to support good governments or dis-
sent against bad ones, the government should not be able to control what informa-
tion was being taught to students because it could bias them, thereby making their 
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consent illegitimate.”3 The Progressive era pragmatists “enhanced” dissent with 
their focus on the inquiry, questioning, and experimentation necessary to solve 
social problems in the dialogue of democracy,4 yet they also fell short of develop-
ing a unified and sustainable praxis of dissent.5
Defining dissent can be a contested affair. Its manifestation can fall along 
a spectrum from a polite difference of opinion to an impassioned challenge on 
the theoretical level or from civil disobedience to armed conflict on the practical 
level. Stitzlein works through various conceptions of dissent, culling out some of 
the negative connotations to arrive at a notion of effective dissent. “Good dissent-
ers” are intellectual, practice moral sensitivity, and embody the pragmatist spirit 
as connected to certain dispositions in the form of Deweyan democratic habits.6 
After going a bit further into the transformation of dissent from a negative 
to a positive right in chapter 4, the theme then requires that we envision teaching 
for dissent as a way to guarantee that we are progressively seeking what our gov-
ernment owes us, in contradistinction from the notion of dissent as a means of 
stopping the government from violating our fundamental rights. This shift in per-
spective is a logical puzzle, however; how would we frame issues as opportunities 
for positive dissent without having to invoke challenges to the status quo and thus 
work from a reactionary position? A neopragmatist approach might help here if 
we link the positive right of dissent with the liberal idea of social progress, that is, 
lessening cruelty in the world.7 Then we can see dissent as an open-ended practice 
where the objective is not so much to eradicate a specific condition as it is to refuse 
to accept the current conditions as satisfactory. Thus dissent as a positive right 
could be understood as part of our citizenship education alongside the American 
political tradition8 and the faltering expectation that each successive generation 
will have it better than their parents.
A classical pragmatist would likely be sympathetic to the argument that dis-
sent has a place in schools. A neopragmatist’s linguistic cynicism regarding the very 
concept of dissent being effective in our politically contested education discourse 
should be tempered by the social hope9 that we can realize a better democracy 
through such discourse and that citizen education is the place where it will hap-
pen.10 Such optimism is discussed in chapter 7 (co-authored with Carrie Nolan) as 
part of the cultivation of dissent in students. This is another of those unfortunate 
instances where the terminology undermines the point being made: “Cultivat-
ing dissent” sounds a lot like sowing the seeds of discontent, an offense that most 
school principals would award with expulsion rather than an “A” in Civics. One 
can only imagine the apoplectic response of a school board when such charges are 
levied against a teacher!
The book also equates dissent with political activism in a way that does not 
include other trajectories of dissent, such as economic or social activism. Stitzlein 
would imply that all dissent in civil society, especially if we propose to instruct our 
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young citizens how to practice it in a democracy, is eventually political. But our dis-
course is not universally political; in fact, one might argue that economic activism 
is more dominant and explains a lot more of the social disparities that inform our 
politics. It is chicken or egg, perhaps, but imagining how we educate citizens for 
economic activism is not very far-fetched. Actions taken since the Great Recession, 
such as establishing the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau and the ongoing 
“Occupy” movements, show that activism has potentially more momentum on this 
front than it does in trying to convince politicians and citizens that the teachers can 
meet the Common Core and train a cohort of conscientious objectors. Given the 
mixed reactions to Army private Manning’s fate and the status of Edward Snowden 
in the age of WikiLeaks, it is perhaps hard to believe that schools could figure out 
an acceptable approach to teaching for dissent.
This potential objection aside, Stitzlein does provide ideas about the “how” 
of teaching for dissent without getting too tangled in the machinations of the very 
politics that would need to exist to help the citizens digest the “why.” The popular 
TV-series House of Cards and the frustrations with injustice portrayed by Sunday 
morning pundits would have us think that what is right or possible has nothing to do 
with the outcomes of political activism. In the practical—but not pragmatist—sense, 
teaching for dissent seems a radical and unlikely addition to the education program 
as driven by the state. But if the socio-political establishment cannot stomach a mod-
ule on dissent in the taxpayer-funded curriculum, there may yet be other ways to 
teach for dissent as Stitzlein desires. The aforementioned MOOCs that are causing 
administrators no shortage of worry over the fate of the traditional education model 
may come to the pragmatist’s aid. Since teaching for dissent seems to have underly-
ing liberal—if not anti-capitalist—leanings, then widespread and free access to les-
sons on dissent could be developed with MOOCs. This would take advantage of the 
medium that has proven so effective for dissent in practice, such as the Twittering of 
the Syrian uprising and Facebook-driven political opposition in the United States. 
Stitzlein does discuss how teachers practice dissent online, most often in the anony-
mous realm of blogs and forums that foment criticism of the education system itself.11
There is the briefest mention of the legitimacy of government hinging on the 
consent of the governed12 that could play with the con/dis-sent derivations; yet Stit-
zlein wants to keep the violent protest forms of dissent (as a means to undermine 
government authority) away from the schoolhouse. This is a prudent position when 
teaching for dissent in a unit in eighth grade social studies, yet the modest thesis 
seems to disenfranchise the power and social value of full-fledged student dem-
onstrations led by the tweed-coated faculty. There is probably more to be gained 
from C. Wright Mills than John Stuart Mill when trying to convince contemporary 
American society that our liberty depends on teaching for dissent.
There is much to contemplate in Teaching for Dissent if one steps back from 
the cacophony of our education debates and recognizes that our core political values 
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are rooted in dissent and that it should be taught in school. The pragmatist ideal is 
a well-educated citizenry that practices democratic discourse and looks for better 
outcomes. The ugly reality is that we cannot agree on a national standard of achieve-
ment in the subjects that the politicians do care about, like reading and math, so 
cultivating dissent in the curriculum seems like it will remain a luxury of the pri-
vate liberal arts college. If we are satisfied that the mantle of dissent is adequately 
carried by such intellectual elites, then carry on. Yet it appears that Stitzlein is ask-
ing for a more elementary approach to dissent that will require a lot more consent.
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